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“No One Saw This Coming” 
Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models 
 
 
 
“She was asking me if these things are so large, how come everyone missed it?” 
Luis Garicano on the Queen’s visit to LSE, November 2008 
 
“Economics is the science of confusing stocks with flows.” 
Michal Kalecki (circa 1936) 
 
“The financial crisis will hopefully stimulate a revival of accounting scholarship aimed at understanding the 
relationship between accounting practice and the macro political and economic environment in which it 
operates.” 
Patricia Arnold, June 2009  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
On March 14, 2008, Robert Rubin spoke at a session at the Brookings Institution in Washington, 
stating that "few, if any people anticipated the sort of meltdown that we are seeing in the credit 
markets at present”. Rubin is a former US Treasury Secretary, member of the top management team 
at Citigroup bank and one of the top Democratic Party policy advisers. On 9 December of that year 
Glenn  Stevens,  Governor  of  the  Reserve  Bank  of  Australia  commented  on  the  “international 
financial turmoil through which we have lived over the past almost year and a half, and the intensity 
of the events since mid September this year”. He went on to assert: “I do not know anyone who 
predicted this course of events. This should give us cause to reflect on how hard a job it is to make 
genuinely useful forecasts. What we have seen is truly a ‘tail’ outcome – the kind of outcome that 
the routine forecasting process never predicts. But it has occurred, it has implications, and so we 
must reflect on it” (RBA 2008). And in an April 9, 2009 lecture Nout Wellink - chairman of the 
Basel Committee that formulates banking stability rules and president of the Dutch branch of the 
European  Central  Bank  -  told  his  audience  that  “[n]o  one  foresaw  the  volume  of  the  current 
avalanche”.    3 
These are three examples of the idea that ‘no one saw this coming’. This has been a common 
view from the very beginning of the credit crisis, shared from the upper echelons of the global 
financial and policy hierarchy and in academia, to the general public. It continues to be publicised, 
as documented in more detail in the next section. And yet it would be premature to ask “Why did 
nobody notice?", as Queen Elizabeth did as she inaugurated a new building at the London School of 
Economics in November 2008
1. Contrary to Governor Stevens’ assertion, it is not difficult to find 
predictions of a credit or debt crisis in the months and years leading up to it, and of the grave impact 
on the economy this would have - not only by pundits and bloggers, but by serious analysts from 
the world of academia, policy institutes, think tanks and finance. The starting point for the present 
study is that there is something to be learned from this observation – or, in the words of Governor 
Stevens, “it has occurred, it has implications, and so we must reflect on it”. To do precisely that is 
the aim of this paper. 
The credit crisis and ensuing recession may be viewed as  a ‘natural experiment’ in the 
validity of economic models. Those models that failed to foresee something this momentous may 
need changing in one way or another. And the change is likely to come from those models (if they 
exist) which did lead their users to anticipate instability. The plan of this paper, therefore, is to 
document such anticipations, to identify the underlying models, to compare them to models in use 
by official forecasters and policy makers, and to draw out the implications. 
There is an immediate link to accounting, organizations and society. Previewing the results, 
it will be found that ‘accounting’ (or flow-of-funds) models of the economy are the shared mindset 
of those analysts who worried about a  credit-cum-debt crisis followed by recession, before the 
policy  and  academic  establishment  did.  They  are  ‘accounting’  models  in  the  sense  that  they 
represent households’, firms’ and governments’ balance sheets and their interrelations. If society’s 
wealth  and  debt  levels  reflected  in  balance  sheets  are  among  the  determinants  of  its  growth 
sustainability and its financial stability, such models are likely to timely signal threats of instability. 
Models that do not – such as the general equilibrium models widely used in academic and Central 
Bank analysis – are prone to ‘Type II errors’ of false negatives – rejecting the possibility of crisis 
when in reality it is just months ahead. Moreover, if balance sheets matter to the economy’s macro 
performance, than the development of micro-level accounting rules and practices are integral to 
understanding broader economic development. This view shows any clear dividing line between 
‘economics’ and ‘accounting’ to be artificial, and on the contrary implies a role for an ‘accounting 
                                                 
1 Her question was directed at LSE Professor Luis Garicano, who responded: "At every stage, someone was relying on 
somebody else; and everyone thought they were doing the right thing." (Pierce, 2008).   4 
of economics’ research field. The organizational dimension is that national forecasters such as the 
firm  Macroeconomic  Advisers  in  the  US  –  discussed  in  section  6  -    are  organizationally  and 
personally intertwined with official policy and with academia in such ways as to hinder, perhaps, a 
critical evaluation of the foundational models underpinning their forecasts, and consideration of an 
accounting perspective on forecasting (discussed in section 3).  Thus this paper aims to encourage 
accountants  to  bring  their  professional  expertise  to  what  is  traditionally  seen  as  the  domain  of 
economists -  the assessment of financial stability and forecasting of the business cycle. 
With a few exceptions, this point seems to have been overlooked to date. The dominant 
response in the wake of the credit crisis in the accountants and auditors community has been to re-
examine accounting regulations such as ‘fair-value’ accounting (Boyer, 2007; Laux and Leuz 2009), 
mark-to-market accounting, lax auditing practices, and the like; or to ask how accounting models 
can reflect what has happened (Roberts and Jones, 2009). And indeed, there is “a range of roles 
played  by  accounting  in  strengthening  and  enabling  conditions  and  processes  which  led  to  the 
current economic crisis” (McSweeney 2009:2). But it is important to stress from the outset that the 
present paper aims to make an entirely different point. While it is topical in that it examines the 
recent credit crisis, its key argument is relevant beyond this episode. This study is fundamentally 
about how accounting as a discipline relates to business studies and economics – especially, macro 
economics. It is a response to the call by Arnold (2009) in this Journal to examine “our failure to 
understand  the  linkages  between  micro  accounting  and  regulatory  technologies,  and  the 
macroeconomic  and  political  environment  in  which  accounting  operates”,  and  “to  provide 
solutions”. It is likewise a response to the need identified by Hopwood (2009) to “explore the 
interface between accounting and finance”. This paper does not itself report on such exploration, 
but it aims to develop a framework that shows the need for such more detailed accounting research.  
The argument of this study is that recognizing the accounting forms in which economic (including 
financial) relations of necessity exist, is important – perhaps even indispensible – for understanding 
the economic and financial system’s sustainability, and whether there is a financial crisis looming. 
This thesis will be developed along the following lines. 
In the next two sections the results of the ‘fieldwork’ of this research are presented. Section 
2 briefly documents the sense of surprise at the credit crisis among academics and policymakers, 
giving rise to the view that ‘no one saw this coming’. Section 3 (and the Appendix) is a careful 
survey – applying a number of selection criteria - of those professional and academic analysts who 
did ‘see it coming’, and who issued public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real 
estate  prices  and  leading  to  recession.  The  common  elements  in  their  analyses  are  identified, 
including an ‘accounting’ view of the economy. In section 4 the structure of accounting (or flow-of-  5 
funds) models underlying some of the most explicit of these predictions is explored. Section 5 in 
turn describes and explores the mainstream alternative of ‘equilibrium’ models used by official 
national  forecasters  and  international  bodies  such  as  the  EU,  OECD  and  IMF.  Section  6  is  a 
systematic comparison of the two types of models and their underlying views and section 7 reflects 
on their theoretical pedigrees. The final section summarizes the arguments and evidence of this 
paper,  reflects  on  the  implications,  and  points  to  opportunities  for  fruitful  follow-up  research.  6 
 
2. ‘No one Saw This Coming’ 
 
The view that “[n]o one foresaw the volume of the current avalanche” appears justified by a lack of 
discussion,  in  the  academic  and  policy  press,  of  the  possibility  that  financial  globalization 
harboured significant risks, or that the US real estate market and its derivative products were in 
dangerous  waters.  Wellink  (2009)  quoted  a  2006  IMF  report  on  the  global  real  estate  boom 
asserting that there was “little evidence (..) to suggest that the expected or likely market corrections 
in  the  period  ahead  would  lead  to  crises  of  systemic  proportions”.  On  the  contrary,  those 
developments  now  seen  as  culprits  of  the  crisis  were  until  recently  lauded  by  policy  makers, 
academics, and the business community. The following examples illustrate. 
In an October 12, 2005 speech to the National Association for Business Economics, the then 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spoke about the "development of financial products, 
such as asset-backed securities, collateral loan obligations, and credit default swaps, that facilitate 
the dispersion of risk… These increasingly complex financial instruments have contributed to the 
development of a far more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than the one that 
existed just a quarter-century ago." In line with these beliefs on increased ‘resilience’, Greenspan 
had in February 2005 asserted the US House Financial Services Committee that "I don' t expect that 
we will run into anything resembling a collapsing [housing] bubble, though it is conceivable that we 
will  get  some  reduction  in  overall  prices  as  we' ve  had  in  the  past,  but  that  is  not  a  particular 
problem." 
Similarly,  the  Canadian  academic  Philip  Das  in  a  2006  survey  article  of  financial 
globalization pointed out its benefits as “[f]inancial risks, particularly credit risks, are no longer 
borne by banks. They are increasingly moved off balance sheets. Assets are converted into tradable 
securities, which in turn eliminates credit risks. Derivative transactions like interest rate swaps also 
serve the same purpose [of eliminating credit risks, DJB]”. Likewise, in August 2006, the IMF 
published  “Financial  Globalization:  A  Reappraisal”  which,  despite  its  title,  confirmed  IMF 
conventional wisdom that (p.1) “there is little systematic evidence to support widely cited claims 
that financial globalization by itself leads to deeper and more costly crises.” 
As to the business community, Landler (2007, 2008) reports that Klaus-Peter Müller, head 
of the New York branch of Commerzbank for more than a decade, in a 2008 New York Times article 
asked “Did I know in March of ’04 that there was a U.S. subprime market that was going to face 
serious problems in the next few years? No, I didn’t have the slightest idea. I was a happy man 
then.”  Josef  Ackermann,  CEO  of  Deutsche  Bank,  likewise  remembers  a  July  2007  luncheon   7 
attended by chief executives of leading banks, political leaders, and senior Federal Reserve officials 
to discuss the looming risks to the financial system, on which the deepening woes in the subprime 
mortgage market did not figure high on the agenda: “We clearly underestimated the impact”, said 
Ackermann. 
These assessments by the experts carried over to a popular view, enunciated in the mass 
media,  that  the  recessionary  impacts  of  the  credit  crisis  came  out  of  the  blue.  USA  Today  in 
December 2006 reported on the fall in house prices that had just started that summer, “the good 
news is that far more economists are in the optimist camp than the pessimist camp. Although a 
handful are predicting the economy will slide into a housing-led recession next year, the majority 
anticipate the economy will continue to grow” (Hagenbauch 2006). Kaletsky (2008) wrote in the 
Financial Times of “those who failed to foresee the gravity of this crisis - a group that includes Mr 
King,  Mr  Brown,  Alistair  Darling,  Alan  Greenspan  and  almost  every  leading  economist  and 
financier in the world.” 
The surprise at this gravity was proportionate to the optimism beforehand.  Greenspan (2008) 
in  his  October  2008  testimony  before  the  Committee  of  Government  Oversight  and  Reform 
professed  to  “shocked  disbelief”  while  watching  his  “whole  intellectual  edifice  collapse  in  the 
summer of [2007]”. Das (2008) conceded that contrary to his earlier view of financial globalization 
‘eliminating’ credit risks, in fact “[p]artial blame for the fall 2008 meltdown of the global financial 
market does justly go to globalization.” The typical pattern was one of optimism shortly before and 
surprise shortly after the start of the crisis.   8 
 
3. Common Elements of an Alternative View  
 
Despite  appearances,  this  mainstream  view  was  not  the  only  serious  ex  ante  assessment.  An 
alternative, less sanguine interpretation of financial developments was publicized, and it was not 
confined to the inevitable fringe of bearish financial commentators. In this section serious analysis 
and public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real estate prices and leading to 
recession are documented. 
A major concern in collecting these data must be the ‘stopped clock syndrome’. A stopped 
clock  is  correct  twice  a  day,  and  the  mere  existence  of  predictions  is  not  informative  on  the 
theoretical validity of such predictions since, in financial market parlance, ‘every bear has his day’. 
Elementary statistical reasoning suggests that given a large number of commentators with varying 
views on some topic, it will be possible to find any prediction on that topic, at any point in time. 
With  a  large  number  of  bloggers  and  pundits  continuously  making  random  guesses,  erroneous 
predictions will be made and quickly assigned to oblivion, while correct guesses will be magnified 
and repeated after the fact. This in itself is no indication of their validity, but only of confirmation 
bias. 
In distinguishing the lucky shots from insightful predictions, the randomness of guesses is a 
feature to be exploited. Random guesses are supported by all sorts of reasoning (if at all), and will 
have little theory in common. Conversely, for a set of correct predictions to attain ex post credibility, 
it  is  additionally  required  that  they  are  supported  by  a  common  theoretical  framework.  These 
requirements, applied in this paper, will help identify the elements of a valid analytical approach to 
financial stability, and get into focus the contrast with conventional models. 
In  collecting  these  cases  in  an  extensive  search  of  the  relevant  literature,  four  selection 
criteria were applied. Only analysts were included who provide some account on how they arrived 
at their conclusions. Second, the analysts included went beyond predicting a real estate crisis, also 
making the link to real-sector recessionary implications, including an analytical account of those 
links. Third, the actual prediction must have been made by the analyst and available in the public 
domain,  rather  than  being  asserted  by  others.  Finally,  the  prediction  had  to  have  some  timing 
attached  to  it.  Applying  these  criteria  led  to  the  exclusion  of  a  number  of  (often  high  profile) 
candidates - as detailed in the Appendix - so that the final selection is truly the result of critical 
scrutiny. 
Descriptions  of  these  analysts  and  their  assessment  are  relegated  to  an  Appendix.  A 
summary overview is presented in Table 1. The twelve analysts described there - the number is   9 
entirely an outcome of the selection criteria - commented on the US, UK, Australian, Danish and 
global  conditions  in  housing,  finance  and  the  broader  economy.  All  except  one  are  (or  were) 
analysts and commentators of global fame. They are a mixed company of academics, government 
advisers,  consultants,  investors,  stock  market  commentators  and  one  graduate  student,  often 
combining these roles. Already between 2000 and 2006 they warned specifically about a housing-
led recession within years, going against the general mood and official assessment, and well before 
most observers turned critical from late 2007. Together they belie the notion that ’no one saw this 
coming’, or that those who did were either professional doomsayers or lucky guessers. 
But there is a more important, constructive contribution. An analysis of these cases allows 
for  the  identification  of  any  common  underlying  analytical  framework,  which  apparently  helps 
detect threats of instability. Surveying these assessments and forecasts, there appears to be a set of 
interrelated elements central and common to the contrarians’ thinking. This comprises a concern 
with financial assets as distinct from real-sector assets, with the credit flows that finance both forms 
of wealth, with the debt growth accompanying growth in financial wealth, and with the accounting 
relation between the financial and real economy. In the remainder of this section these issues will be 
discussed in turn. 
 
< Insert Table 1: Anticipations of the Housing Crisis and Recession> 
 
A broadly shared element of analysis is the distinction between financial wealth and real assets. 
Several of the commentators (Schiff and Richebächer) adhere to the ‘Austrian School’ in economics, 
which means that they emphasize savings, production (not consumption) and real capital formation 
as  the  basis  of  sustainable  economic  growth.  Richebächer  (2006a:4)  warns  against  ““wealth 
creation”  though  soaring  asset  prices”  and  sharply  distinguishes  this  from  “saving  and 
investment…” (where investment is in real-sector, not financial assets). Likewise Shiller (2003) 
warns  that  our  infatuation  with  the  stock  market  (financial  wealth)  is  fuelling  volatility  and 
distracting us from more the durable economic prospect of building up real assets. Hudson (2006a) 
comments on the unsustainable “growth of net worth through capital gains”. 
A concern with debt as the counterpart of financial wealth follows naturally. “The great 
trouble for the future is that the credit bubble has its other side in exponential debt growth” writes 
Richebächer  (2006b:1).  Madsen  from  2003  worried  that  Danes  were  living  on  borrowed  time 
because of the mortgage debt which “had never been greater in our economic history”. Godley in 
2006 published a paper titled Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur where he demonstrated the US 
economy’s dependence on debt growth. He argued it would plunge the US into a “sustained growth   10 
recession … somewhere before 2010” (Godley and Zezza, 2006:3). Schiff points to the low savings 
rate of the United States as its worst malady, citing the transformation from being the world’s 
largest creditor nation in the 1970s to the largest debtor nation by the year 2000. Hudson (2006a) 
emphasized the same ambiguous potential of house price ‘wealth’ already in the title of his Saving, 
Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation, where he identified the ‘large debt overhead - 
and the savings that form the balance-sheet counterpart to it’ as the ‘anomaly of today’s [US] 
economy’. He warned that ‘[r]ising debt-service payments will further divert income from new 
consumer spending. Taken together, these factors will further shrink the “real”  economy, drive 
down  those  already  declining  real  wages,  and  push  our  debt-ridden  economy  into  Japan-style 
stagnation or worse.” (Hudson 2006b). Janszen (2009) wrote that “US households and businesses, 
and the government itself, had since 1980 built up too much debt. The rate of increase in debt was 
unsustainable… Huge imbalances in the US and global economy developed for over 30 years. Now 
they  are  rebalancing,  as  many  non-mainstream  economists  have  warned  was  certain  to  happen 
sooner or later.” Keen (2006) wrote that the debt-to-GDP ratio in Australia (then 147 per cent) “will 
exceed 160 per cent of GDP by the end of 2007. We simply can' t keep borrowing at that rate. We 
have to not merely stop the rise in debt, but reverse it. Unfortunately, long before we manage to do 
so, the economy will be in a recession.” 
These  quotes  already  reflect  a  further  concern,  that  growth  in  financial  wealth  and  the 
attendant growth in debt can become a determinant (instead of an outcome) of economic growth, 
undermining its sustainability and leading to a downturn. There is a recurrent emphasis (e.g. Baker 
2007), that home equity-fuelled consumption has in recent years sustained stable growth (especially 
in  the  US  and  UK)  more  than  anything  else,  and  that  this  was  dangerous.  Harrison  (2007) 
juxtaposed his view to those who “assume that the health of the property market depends upon the 
condition of the rest of the economy. In fact, … property is the key factor that shapes the business 
cycle, not the other way  around.”  Baker  (2002) wrote that  “[w]hile the short-term  effects of  a 
housing bubble appear very beneficial—just as was the case with the stock bubble and the dollar 
bubble—the long-term effects from its eventual deflation can be extremely harmful”. Godley and 
Wray (2000) argued that stable growth in the US was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ 
debt growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Their view was that as soon as 
debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years - growth would falter and recession 
set in. 
This recessionary impact of the bursting of asset bubbles is also a shared view. The bursting 
of the international housing bubble was seen to have “a severe impact on the world economy and 
may  even  result  in  a  recession”  (Sørensen,  2006:97).  Richebächer  (2006a:4)  in  July  2006   11 
commented that “[t]he one thing that still separates the U.S. economy from economic and financial 
disaster is rising house prices that apparently justify ever more credit and debt”… and in August 
2006 that “a recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable for the U.S. economy.” Aagain, 
“[t]here is no question that the U.S. housing bubble is finished. All remaining questions pertain 
solely to speed, depth and duration of the economy’s downturn” (Richebächer, 2006c:9). Roubini 
on August 23, 2006 - only weeks after US house prices had started falling  - already wrote that 
“[b]y itself this [house price] slump is enough to trigger a US recession.” 
  Finally, emphasis on the role of credit cycles in the business cycle leads to a long-term view 
on  credit  cycles.  Sørensen  criticizes  most  housing  market  analyses  for  not  looking  beyond  the 
1980s-2000s period. These were the years of a credit boom, and only by looking at longer periods 
can the dynamics and dangers of the housing market be detected, he demonstrates. Also others 
place the long credit boom that started in the mid 1980s as central to understanding economic 
performance, and assert that acceleration of growth in lending and debt has endangered stability 
since. The assessment of the 2007-8 collapse is so embedded in a longer-term view. “This recovery 
has been fueled by a housing bubble, just as the late 90s cycle was fueled by a stock bubble,” 
commented Baker. Accordingly, US economic growth since the 2000 dotcom crash, is viewed by 
several as ‘phony’ growth in that it was (consciously or unwittingly) engineered by the monetary 
authorities via generous credit policies, rather than driven by real-sector performance.   12 
4.  Accounting Models of the Economy 
 
These concerns with wealth, debt, and credit flows can be summarized in saying that the above 
authors take an ‘accounting’ or ‘flow-of-funds’ view of the economy. This is most explicit with 
Keen (2006), Hudson (2006a, 2006b), and especially Godley (1999; also, Godley and Lavoie 2007a, 
2007b), who each actually present explicit accounting models of the economy. Key features of such 
models include (a) the circular flow of goods and money, (b) a separate representation of stocks 
(inventories, wealth and debt) and flows (goods, services and funds), (c) explicit modelling of the 
financial  sector  as  distinct  from  the  real  economy,  so  allowing  for  independent  growth  and 
contraction effects from finance on the economy, (d) non-optimising behaviour by economic agents 
in an environment of uncertainty, and (e) accounting identities (not the equilibrium concept) as 
determinants  of  model  outcomes  in  response  to  shocks  in  the  environment  or  in  policy.  These 
features  are  graphically  captured  in  Figure  1  taken  from  Hudson  (2006b),  which  depicts  an 
economy  (simplified,  without  foreign  sector)  viewed  through  a  flow-of-funds  prism.  Similar 
‘circuitist’ representations may be found in theoretical work by Rochon (1999) and Graziani (2003). 
This section discusses how those elements of ‘accounting’ or ‘flow-of-funds’ models are 
central in understanding the determinants of (and boundaries to) the economy’s growth, and its 
likelihood of entering into a debt-driven recession. The significance of studying these models is also 
in  identifying  the  differences  with  conventional  policy  models,  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
Juxtaposing the two approaches of ‘accounting’ versus ‘equilibrium’ models may help understand 
why  ‘no  one  saw  this  coming’  among  users  of  equilibrium  models,  while  some  others  using 
accounting models did.  Further, conceptualizing both types of theories is one way to identify entry 
points for “accounting’s engagement with political economy” which “can be defined more broadly 
to  include  any  non-neoclassical  economic  framework  for  understanding  the  economy  and 
accounting’s relationship to it.” (Arnold 2009). Flow-of-fund models, and their underpinnings taken 
from psychology and political economy, are among these non-neoclassical economic frameworks. 
 
<insert Figure 1: Schematic Overview of Flow-of-fund Models> 
 
In Figure 1, the “finance, insurance and real estate” (FIRE) sector includes all sorts of wealth-
managing nonbank firms (pension funds, insurers, money managers, merchant banks, real estate 
agents etc.), as well as deposit-taking banks, which generate credit flows. It is conceptually separate 
from the real sector which comprises government, firms and households. Liquidity from the FIRE 
sector flows to firms, households and the government as they borrow. It facilitates fixed-capital   13 
investment, production and consumption, the value of which - by accounting necessity - is jointly 
equal to real-sector income in the form of profit, wages and taxes plus financial investment and 
obligations (principally, interest payments). Funds so originate in the banking part of the FIRE 
sector  and  either  circulate  in  the  real  economy,  or  they  return  to  the  FIRE  sector  as  financial 
investments  or  in  payment  of  debt  service  and  financial  fees.  Total  credit  flows  (in  nominal 
currency units) are normally increasing year on year, reflecting positive profit and interest rates. 
Thus, there is a trade-off between the financing of production (out of retained earnings and 
fresh lending) on the one hand, and credit flows returning into the financial sector on the other. This 
trade-off is absent from the mainstream models and debate, but is crucial to understanding crisis, 
according  to  Friedman  (2009):  “an  important  question—which  no  one  seems  interested  in 
addressing—is what fraction of the economy' s total returns … is absorbed up front by the financial 
industry.”  Flow-of-fund  models  depict  how  this  neglected  question  matters.  Absorption  of 
investment by the FIRE sector takes the form of financial wealth creation and growth of its balance 
sheet counterpart, debt. Excessive debt growth brings a debt deflation and recession. Debt is central 
to flow of fund models but literally absent (as will be shown in the next section) from official 
equilibrium models. Therefore they cannot anticipate a debt deflation recession such as we now 
experience.  Researchers and policy makers employing these models therefore have no conceptual 
framework to expect a finance-driven collapse. 
Another presentation of flow-of-fund-models, which is especially suited to bring out their 
accounting nature, is in matrix form. Figure 2 presents the matrix of flows of transactions of the 
Godley (1999) model. Figure 3 presents the stocks in balance sheets, by sector. 
 
<insert Figure 2: The Flow of Funds in Matrix Representation> 
<insert Figure 3: Macro Balance Sheets in Matrix Representation> 
 
Like the Figure 1 representation of a flow-of-funds model taken from Hudson (2006a), the Godley 
(1999)  model  consists  of  four  sectors,  explicitly  separating  out  the  financial  sector,  with  their 
properties and interrelations represented in over 60 equations. It reflects Keynesian uncertainty (on 
which  more  in  section  6)  by  including  ‘expected’  values  of,  for  instance,  inventories.  Other 
important elements in common with Figure 1 are the centrality of bank credit flows, since “evolving 
finance in the form of bank loans is required if production is to be financed in advance of sales 
being  made  and  if  profit  is  to  be  extracted  from  firms  and  paid  over  to  households”  (Godley, 
1999:405). Yet another element is explicitly including payment flows such as interest payments, 
“not quite the same as in the national accounts, where it is standard practice… to ignore interest   14 
payments,  although  they  are  an  inevitable  cost  given  that  production  takes  time”  (Godley, 
1999:405). 
Godley (1999:394) explains that: “[e]ach row and column of the flow matrix sums to zero 
on the principle that each flow comes from somewhere and goes somewhere. The financial balance 
of each sector – the gap between its income and its expenditure reading vertically [in Figure 2] – is 
always equal to the total of its transactions in financial assets.” The model reflects changes in the 
value  of  financial  stocks,  in  inventories,  and  in  household  wealth.  Because  of  the  accounting 
equalities, this is equal to the sum of government debt and inventories (reading horizontally at the 
foot of Figure 3). The “watertight accounting of the model implies that there will always be one 
equation which is logically implied by the others” (Godley 1999:395). 
How  did  the  structure  of  flow-of-fund  models  allow  their  users  to  distinguish  between 
financially  sustainable  and  unsustainable  growth,  and  so  to  anticipate  a  credit-cum-debt  crises? 
Consider the reasoning, along the following lines. A benchmark scenario of financially sustainable 
growth  is  when  the  economy  expands  with  constant  fractions  of  its  credit  flows  going  to  the 
financial  and  real  sectors.  Debt  burdens  do  not  grow  as  proportion  of  the  real  economy  and 
therefore remain serviceable, and the FIRE sector cannot have a bad loan problem. Conversely, debt 
growth is the central factor in undermining the financial sustainability of economic growth. Of all 
possible configurations of behaviour in the Godley model, only a default on debt can “unbalance the 
banks’ consolidated balance sheet” Godley (1999: 397).  
Conditions for such default may (but need not) develop as, different from the benchmark 
scenario,  financial  expansion  or  financial  innovation  occurs.  This  may  be  driven  by  the  real 
economy requiring more of its wealth to be managed in financial instruments and assets, or because 
of the need for new financial instruments responding to changed needs to save, to invest and to 
smooth consumption. This will be reflected in a one-off (or in any case temporary) shifting of credit 
flow  fractions,  with  a  larger  fraction  being  used  for  financial  transactions  vis  a  vis  real-sector 
transactions in goods and services. Financial innovation so serves the real economy’s need, in that it 
boosts real-sector productivity and so its ability to service its increased debts. But it also opens up 
the possibility of a sustained drain of liquidity from the real to the FIRE sector, so inflating asset 
prices – a credit bubble, or harmful ‘financialization’ of the economy (Epstein 2005). Arnold (2009), 
quoting Giovanni Arrighi’s (2007:230) definition of financialization as  the ‘capacity of finance 
capital to take over and dominate, for a while at least, all the activities of the business world’ 
identifies the financialization process since the late 1970s as a “transformation within the macro 
political  economy  [which]  poses  several  questions  for  accounting  research  as  we  attempt  to   15 
understand  accounting’s  relationship  to  the  unfolding  crisis”.  Consider  this  ‘financialisation’ 
scenario, pertinent to recent experience, through a flow-of-funds lens. 
By accounting identity, any credit flows to firms and households (through banks’ credit 
creation as they lend) exceeding the growth of investment, production and consumption in the real 
economy will be held as wealth, and so invested in FIRE sector assets. This extra liquidity inflates 
the money value of financial assets and instruments (housing, stocks, bonds, currency, derivative 
instruments etc.), so increasing returns on financial investments. Through their rising net worth, 
firms and households can - if lending regulations allow -  borrow more against their collateral; and 
if they believe this to be sustainable, they will
2. This means that banks create yet additional credit 
which is again invested in the FIRE sector, further pushing up asset prices. 
Each flow of credit has its balance sheet counterpart in increased debt levels for firms and 
households. The new situation is characterized by (a) higher returns on financial assets relative to 
real-economy investment, and (b) a larger part of the (say, annual) credit flow going towards debt 
servicing and financial fees, and a smaller part to investment in the real sector (see Stockhammer, 
2004 for evidence on the recent boom). In early stages of a financial asset boom, the individual 
benefits from (1) will more than balance the costs of (2), especially if future debt servicing costs are 
discounted, un-taxed or simply neglected in a bull market psychology. This encourages a next cycle 
of credit flows, debt growth and asset price rises. With psychological mechanisms such as herding 
behaviour leading to housing or stock market euphoria - and in the absence of regulation to stop it - 
there can be a self-sustained dynamic of credit flows shifting away from the real economy and into 
financial asset market, with ever growing financial asset returns and individual net worth figures, 
and a growing debt service burden on the real economy. Along the course of this financial boom, 
Friedman’s (2009) all-important ‘fraction of the economy' s total returns absorbed up front by the 
financial industry’ rises and the function of the financial system in the economy changes from 
supportive to extractive. Consumption – and the production that depends on it -   may become 
financed more by fresh credit and debt flows from the FIRE sector based on capital gains than by 
real-sector wages  and profit. Thus net saving by  firms and households may  fall  and even turn 
negative. 
An accounting (or balance sheet) view of the economy makes clear that this dynamic – a 
bubble – is unsustainable in the sense that it is constrained by the real economy’s ability to service 
debt. Yet without policy intervention, it can last for many years or even decades, if starting from 
low levels of indebtedness. A burst occurs as investors realize this constraint is approaching or has 
                                                 
2 This immediately identifies the two sets of factors governing bubble growth: psychology and deregulation (as 
discussed in section 6).   16 
been reached. The severity of the impact of a burst will be the larger as real-economy consumption 
(and thereby production) have grown more dependent on capital gains rather than on wages and 
profit. 
This  ‘financialisation’  scenario  is  a  self-sustained  dynamic  separate  from  real-sector 
fundamentals  (in  other  words,  a  bubble)  increasing  debt  burdens  but  not  bolstering  the  real-
economy’s potential to create valued added from which to repay its growing debt. It is typically 
driven  by  the  psychological  and  political  economy  factors  discussed  in  section  6.  In  terms  of 
financial incentives, its impetus is that it brings increased asset price gains for a time, but this is 
unsustainable in the long term as a source of debt servicing. Borio (2004:5) writes that “contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the growth of markets for tradable instruments … need not have reduced the 
likelihood of funding (liquidity) crises”. On the contrary, applying an accounting lens demonstrates 
that because of the debt growing in parallel with tradable instruments, inevitably a bad loan problem 
(or debt crisis) develops, credit flows dry up –either in a ‘soft landing’ or in a ‘credit crisis’ -  and a 
repositioning of financial portfolios and real-sector activity follows. 
The difference with sustainable financial innovation is difficult to draw while a financial 
bubble lasts, and mostly absent in the mainstream and popular discourses. As Friedman (2009) 
notes, “what is sorely missing in the discussion is attention to what function the financial system is 
supposed to perform in the economy and how well it has been doing it”. That may be true for 
mainstream economists, but - as detailed in the Appendix - an accounting view of the economy did 
allow other analysts to perceive this difference well before the bust. Monitoring the accounting 
relations between the real economy and the financial sector flow revealed the growing imbalance in 
the flow of funds to the real and financial sectors, as well as the extent to which the economy had 
grown dependent on asset price gains. It so led to a projection of the limits to the economy’s debt 
servicing  capacity  and  the  unsustainability  of  credit  and  debt  growth,  resulting  in  the  Table  1 
forecasts. Keen (2007) demonstrates in detail how a flow-of-funds model based on Minsky’s (1978, 
1980) theory leads to this identification. He concludes that  “… [i]n stark contrast to Greenspan’s 
well-known remark that an asset bubble cannot be identified until after it has burst, the bubbles in 
both the share and housing markets were obvious by mid-1994 and 1996 respectively. By mid-1995 
and 2000, they had reached levels that had never previously been experienced. By the time they 
burst,  they  were  3.7  and  2.1  times  their  long-term  averages.  What  is  opaque  from  a 
neoclassical/Austrian perspective is obvious from a Minskian standpoint.” (Keen, 2009: 297).   17 
5.  Structure and Institutionalization of Equilibrium Models 
 
The alternative to the accounting models just reviewed will be referred to as ‘equilibrium’ models, 
after their most important trait. Wealth, debt, and the flow of funds are absent from these models. 
These  are  ‘mainstream‘  models  in  the  sense  that  all  official  macroeconomic  forecasts,  policy 
analyses and scenario building, in all countries, are based on equilibrium models (or on rules of 
thumb
3). They are also ‘mainstream’ in the sense of being based on neoclassical economics, the 
mode of economic analysis that is dominant in the academic discipline of economics. This section 
presents case studies of a national and an international forecasting model of the equilibrium variety. 
The discussion will relate to model structures and the forecasts they generated, as well as to their 
institutional embeddedness and standing in the policy community. 
The national model discussed here is the ‘Washington University Macro Model’ (WUMM) 
used in US policy making, developed and marketed by the firm “Macroeconomic Advisers”
4. The 
“WUMM” is a quarterly econometric system of roughly 600 variables, 410 equations, and 165 
exogenous  variables.  Figure  4  presents  a  schematic  overview.  The  boxes  indicate  the  variables 
included in the model. In the present context, the important observation is that all are real-sector 
variables  except  the  money  supply  and  interest  rates,  the  values  of  which  are  in  turn  fully 
determined by real-sector variables. In contrast to accounting models, the financial sector, and the 
flow of funds it generates, is thus absent (not explicitly modelled) in the model. 
 
<insert Figure 4:  Schematic Overview of the Washington University Macro Model> 
 
The detailed explanation in the WUMM model book confirms that relations between variables in 
the model - represented by the arrows in Figure 4 - reflect the standard assumptions of mainstream 
economics including a life-cycle model of consumption, a transactions model of money demand, a 
vertical  long-run  Phillips  curve,  and  long-run  neoclassical  models  of  fixed  investment,  labour 
demand, pricing and the distribution of income. If these assumptions are correct, then the model 
provides detailed predictions on the real economy. But by design, it cannot reflect a bubble driven 
by credit flows to the FIRE sector, which bursts due to excessive levels of debt: credit flows, the 
                                                 
3 Some authorative forecast, such as those published by the Conference Board, are constructed by projecting current 
trends of ‘Leading Economic Indicators’, using relatively simply ‘rules of thumb‘ for the extrapolation. The success of 
these forecasts relative to the alternatives demonstrates how difficult it is to predict based on theory-based models. 
Naturally, rules of thumb models do well in times of stability but not around points of radical change. 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, all information on the WUMM is taken from the Macroeconomic Advisers site at 
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FIRE sector and debt are not among the variables in the model, nor are they fully reflected in the 
variables which are included. 
Perhaps because of this omission, Macroeconomic Advisers chairman Joel Prakken could 
tell  Reuters  as  late  as  September  2007  that  the  probability  of  recession  was  less  than  50%,  a 
“slightly higher risk then it was a month ago but not a dominant risk.” This was well after Godley 
and associates in April 2007 had predicted output growth “slowing down almost to zero sometime 
between  now  and  2008”  and  in  November  2007  forecast  “a  significant  drop  in  borrowing  and 
private  expenditure  in  the  coming  quarters,  with  severe  consequences  for  growth  and 
unemployment”. 
A prominent example of equilibrium models for international use is the model operated by 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD),  described  in  Rae  and 
Turner (2001). This is the OECD’s “small global forecasting” model linked to its larger forecasting 
model called INTERLINK, used to produce globally-consistent short-term forecasts of the major 
aggregates for the United States, the Euro area, and Japan. Its key variables include output, inflation, 
the trade balance, and import prices. These are driven jointly by neoclassical theory and monetary 
and fiscal policy, exchange rates, and world demand. 
Just as in the WUMM, monetary and financial variables are included, but their values do not 
result from explicitly modeled flows of funds; and they are derived exclusively from real-sector 
developments. For instance, inflation depends on the output gap – that is, the gap between actual 
output and potential output – and various components of imported inflation. The model as a whole 
has  the  property  that  output  gaps  will  eventually  close  to  restore  equilibrium.  Other  financial 
variables  -  including  nominal  exchange  rates  and  short-term  and  long-term  interest  rates  -  are 
determined by forward-looking monetary policy rules in which short-term interest rates depend also 
on the output gap and on the expected future core inflation rate. Bond rates in turn then depend on 
expected future short-term rates. There are no credit flows, asset prices or increasing net worth 
driving a borrowing boom, nor interest payment indicating growing debt burdens, and no balance 
sheet stock and flow variables that would reflect all this. 
It is interesting that the authors recognize this omission, and discuss that such elements can 
be added on an ad hoc basis. Rae and Turner (2001:5) write that this introducing of “alternative 
assumptions … allows a little more economic richness to be temporarily added to the model when it 
is  used  for  policy  analyses,  especially  for  those  situations  in  which  financial  markets  and 
expectations  play  important  roles  in  the  transmission  of  shocks  within  and  between  regions”. 
Likewise, “[s]everal country-specific variables have been added to the domestic demand equations 
in order to capture recent experience. For the United States, a measure of share-market wealth   19 
relative to disposable income has been an important recent determinant of domestic demand. The 
Japanese  equation  includes  the  real  price  of  land  because  the  1990s  cannot  be  explained  by 
monetary and fiscal variables alone. The long stagnation is partly driven by balance sheet problems 
in the financial sector, which in turn is partly the result of the collapse of asset prices since the late 
1980s.” (Rae and Turner, 2001:12). In addition to this ad hoc adjustment to the reality of balance 
sheet  effects,  the  OECD  is  currently  planning  the  introduction  of  a  new  model,  triggered  by 
‘changing conditions’. The new model includes “domestic and global stock-flow consistency with 
respect to wealth linkages and wealth effects” (Richardson 2006), very similar in name at least to 
Godley’s ‘stock-flow consistent model’ (Godley and Lavoie 2007a). 
Still, just three months before the financial crisis broke in August 2007, the OECD released 
its 2007 World Economic Outlook, in which it commented (OECD 2007:7) that 
 
“[i]n its Economic Outlook last autumn, the OECD took the view that the US slowdown was not 
heralding  a  period  of  worldwide  economic  weakness,  unlike,  for  instance,  in  2001.  Rather,  a 
“smooth” rebalancing was to be expected, with Europe taking over the baton from the United States 
in driving OECD growth. Recent developments have broadly confirmed this prognosis. Indeed, the 
current economic situation is in many ways better then what we have experienced in years. Against 
that background, we have stuck to the rebalancing scenario. Our central forecast remains indeed 
quite benign: a soft landing in the United States, a strong and sustained recovery in Europe, a solid 
trajectory in Japan and buoyant activity in China and India. In line with recent trends, sustained 
growth  in  OECD  economies  would  be  underpinned  by  strong  job  creation  and  falling 
unemployment.” 
 
Other important mainstream forecasts by international bodies, such as those by the European 
Commission and the IMF, will not be discussed separately. They derive from models structurally 
similar to that of the OECD, and were subject to the same degree of misprediction around the crisis. 
For  what  they  have  in  common  is  the  rapid  and  unprecedented  revision  of  economic  growth 
forecasts  when  the  credit  crisis  began  to  turn  into  a  recession.  In  the  Economic  Outlook  2008 
published in December 2007, the OECD forecast was that weakness in the US housing sector would 
drag down growth in “the near term” but it “is unlikely to trigger a recession”. GDP growth was 
forecast to 2.0% in 2008. But at the time of this prediction Europe, the US and Japan were already 
in recession, and continued to be so throughout 2008. Instead of the models predicting reality, they 
were constantly catching up with reality.   20 
As an example, Figure 5 presents forecasts for the author’s home of The Netherlands as 
made by the IMF, the European Commision (EC), the OECD (OESO in the Dutch abbreviation), 
the CPB (Centraal Planbureau, the official Dutch agency tasked with constructing macroeconomic 
forecasts) and also by the Dutch branch of the European Central Bank, DNB (De Nederlandsche 
Bank). All these official institutions use equilibrium models in constructing their forecasts. The 
graph shows that within the space of six months, forecasts for 2009 GDP growth were revised from 
+1.2 % to – 3.5 %: a change which had never happened before. At the time of this writing in May 
2009, the official Dutch forecast by the CPB had again been revised to – 4.8 %.   
 
<insert Figure 5: Changing official forecasts for the Dutch economy: Expected GDP growth rate in 
2009, September 2008 – March 2009> 
 
In conclusion of this section, one question that may be raised is why there is this dichotomy of 
equilibrium models dominating official forecasting and policy, and flow-of-funds models in use 
only in non-official analyses. Arnold (2009) asks accountants “[w]hy did neoclassical economic 
thought become unquestioned doctrine in so much of our economic discourse?”. And why indeed 
do accountants have so little to add in the fields of macro financial stability assessment and growth 
forecasting, despite the demonstrated potential? Tentatively, two elements of an answer may be 
suggested: theory and institutionalization. 
  As noted, equilibrium models in use in policy making reflect neoclassical economics, the 
approach to economic analysis that is dominant in academic economics departments. This includes 
the behavioural assumptions of individual optimizing behaviour and a passive role (adapting to the 
‘fundamentals’)  for  the  financial  sector  and  for  the  flow  of  funds.  Flow-of-fund  or  accounting 
models reflect assumptions about the role of the financial sector and about individuals’ behaviour 
which  are  heterodox  relative  to  this  academic  orthodoxy.  Given  the  strong  intertwinement  of 
economics teaching, research and policy making, it is only natural that heterodox models have not 
gained  a  foothold  in  official  forecasting  and  policymaking.  Institutionalization  of  forecasting 
models in policy follows the institutionalization of equilibrium theory in academia.  In order to 
probe this hypothesis, below the institutionalization of the leading US forecasting model WUMM 
within US academia and policy making is studied
5. 
On  its  link  to  orthodox  economic  theory,  the  WUMM  model  book  explains  that  the 
“properties of all key equations are explicitly derived from neoclassical theory, imparting to the 
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model both monetarist and supply-side characteristics in the long run. This emphasis on theory 
endows the model with an internally consistent structure that renders WUMM well suited not only 
for short-run forecasting but also for long-term policy analysis.” 
On the institutionalization, WUMM owner Macroeconomic Advisers, while an independent 
commercial firm, is closely intertwined with official policy and forecasts and with US academia. It 
started in 1982 as Laurence H. Meyer & Associates. The model used by Macroeconomic Advisers 
was developed by Meyer and collaborators at Washington University and licensed to clients from 
1983. The model won wide acclaim in government circles and there is a revolving door between the 
US Federal Reserve and its three Directors, each of whom have held or now hold top positions in 
US monetary policy advice
6.  
The Macroeconomic Advisers approach also reflects the official US viewpoint on financial 
stability  as  its  founder  Laurence  Meyer  participated  in  negotiations  toward  a  new  international 
capital accord and represented the Federal Reserve Board in the international Financial Stability 
Forum.  Significantly,  Meyer  was  also  chairman  of  the  US  Committee  on  Supervisory  and 
Regulatory Affairs and oversaw the Board’s regulatory implementation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act. This act in 1999 replaced the more cautious 1933 Glass Steagall Act and allowed banks to 
trade in mortgages and derivative products. Meyer so maintains close ties with US monetary policy 
making
7. He is also a highly respected academic macro economist. He holds a professorship in 
economics at the University of Washington and published hundreds of articles in leading economics 
journals. 
A tentative conclusion from this case study might be that equilibrium models and official 
forecasters  are  bound  by  ties  of  theoretical  kinship  and  institutional  embeddedness  –  ties  that 
include academia and policy makers at the highest levels. The sociology of science and policy 
making  suggest  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  insert  in  this  constellation  an  approach  that  is   
scientifically  heterodox  and  politically  critical  of  the  monetary  policy  establishment  –  two 
distinguishing features of all analysts listed in Table 1. On the other hand, as noted the OECD 
appears to be moving in the direction of including balance sheet elements in its model. 
                                                 
6 Chairman Joel Prakken served with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prior to co-founding Laurence H. Meyer 
&  Associates.  Co-founder  and  President  Chris  Vervares  was  a  member  of  the  staff  of  the  President’s  Council  of 
Economic Advisers in 1981-1982. Laurence Meyer served on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors from June 1996 
(upon which the name of the firm was changed from Laurence H. Meyer & Associates to Macroeconomic Advisers) to 
January 2002. In addition Brian Sack came to Macroeconomic Advisers in 2004 from a Federal Reserve Board position, 
and in 2009 left to serve at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
7 Macroeconomic Advisers advertises its founder by noting on its site that Meyer was lauded by the then Chairman Alan 
Greenspan who said that, “Larry Meyer has made an important contribution to the Board’s monetary policy. His 
thoughtful insights … have materially enhanced the deliberations of the Board and the Federal Open Market Committee. 
His influence will carry on beyond his tenure as a Board member.”   22 
6. Comparing Accounting and Equilibrium Models 
 
Having  reviewed  both  types  of  models,  in  this  section  their  key  differences  are  identified  and 
discussed. A foundational issue, from which more specific differences follow, is the organizing 
principle of market equilibrium induced by firms and households acting as rationally optimizing 
economic  agents.  In  contrast  to  this  feature  of  models  used  for  official  forecasts,  flow-of-und 
models have an emphasis on accounting identities, on the role of uncertainty, and on economic 
psychology and political economy as the key behavioural assumptions. Absence of the notion of 
equilibrium does not mean that these models are indeterminate. They do have steady states (Godley 
1999) and the logical implications of accounting models are determinate - in some respects more so 
than those of equilibrium models, as will be discussed below. 
Most of the analysts discussed in the Appendix reject rational equilibrium on the basis of 
arguments related to economic psychology and to the Keynesian notion of ‘radical uncertainty’ (as 
opposed to calculable risks). Keen, in a 1995 article titled ‘Finance and Economic Breakdown’ 
explained that 
 
“Keynes argued that uncertainty cannot be reduced to ‘the same calculable states as that 
of certainty itself’ whereas the kind of uncertainty that matters in investment is that 
about which “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937:213-24). Keynes argued that in the 
midst  of  this  incalculable  uncertainty,  investors  form  fragile  expectations  about  the 
future, which are crystallized in the prices they place upon capital sets, and that these 
prices are therefore subject to sudden and violent change.” 
 
This view of human assessment and investment behaviour allows for a crisis of confidence in a way 
that equilibrium models – where investment is always guided by the marginal costs and benefits of 
underlying  real  capital  assets  –  cannot.  This  possibility,  in  turn,  allowed  the  above  analysts  to 
contemplate the plausibility that the general mood is not rational but mistaken, and that crisis looms 
amidst seemingly tranquil conditions. 
Specifically, housing market participants in a credit boom are viewed as led to speculation 
by psychological mechanisms well-known in a bull market. Harrison (2005) observes that economic 
expansion encourages a speculation mentality, with banks lending more against escalating asset 
values and reinforcing the upward spiral. Shiller (2000, 2008) writes of the ‘contagion effect’ as the 
principal mechanism feeding bubbles. Beliefs about wealth creation through asset prices spread via   23 
a number of mechanisms such as ‘new era’ stories that justify the capital gains as being part of a 
‘new  economy’,  where  the  novel  aspect  resides  in,  for  instance,  technology  (in  the  1990s)  or 
globalization  (in  the  2000s).  Shiller  (e.g.,  2000)  has  articulated  motivational  models  of  human 
behaviour such as ‘irrational exuberance’, which allow for states of the economy such as euphoric 
booms, busts, and recession – all of which are difficult to grasp in the conventional models. Other 
authors  refer  to  related  ideas  as  developed  by  Minsky  (e.g.,  1978).  Sørensen  (2006)  similarly 
explains  the  housing  bubble  by  information  cascades  and  herding  behaviour,  where  investors 
observing gainful speculation are more likely to engage in speculation, regardless of the underlying 
fundamentals. 
As to political economy, the boom was seen to be fuelled by monetary policies of generous 
credit flows and low interest rates and the un-taxing of real estate gains via depreciation and interest 
payments tax rules
8. These policies are observed to have helped stave off (intendedly or otherwise) 
recession after the 1999 dotcom collapse, even though in fostering a wealth-cum-debt bubble they 
stored up the present trouble. Janszen (2001) “expected that after the technology bubble crash the 
Federal Reserve and government was certain via tax cuts, rate cuts, and stealth dollar devaluation to 
induce a reflation boom like the 1934 - 1937 reflation created after the 1929 stock market bubble 
bust.” Richebächer (2006a) writes of “ultra-cheap and loose money and credit“, and that “[t]he U.S. 
liquidity deluge of the last few years has had one single source: borrowing against rising assets 
backed by the Fed’s monetary looseness” (Richebächer 2006b). 
This underlying difference with the neoclassical equilibrium assumption finds expression in 
the way models are structured. Models of the macro economy (of either type) consist of equations 
of  two  sorts:  identities  describing  per-definition  relations  between  variables  and  behavioural 
equations  capturing  researcher’s  assumptions  about  decisions  by  economics  agents  on  saving, 
investment, borrowing, lending, employment, and transactions. In equilibrium models, the action is 
in the behavioural assumptions, which drive model responses to shocks and determine performance 
forecasts. The typical behavioural assumption is individual optimization by economic agents of 
their objective function (consumption for households; profit for firms) to some equilibrium level. 
Unlike  equilibrium  models,  the  equations  in  accounting  models  represent  a  transactions 
(flow) matrix and a balance sheet (stock) matrix. Thus, the flow of funds is at the very heart of these 
models,  unlike  the  mere  unit-of-account  function  of  money  in  equilibrium  models.  Explicit 
accounting  models,  such  as  those  developed  by  Godley  (1999),  Graziani  (2003),  Keen  (2009), 
                                                 
8 These issues are well within the purview of accounting research to critically analyze, but as Arnold (2009) notes, 
“we… failed to be … critical in the sense of recognizing the politically and socially contested nature of accounting 
practices… and to grasp developments within the world of accounting practice or describe the ways in which financial 
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Hudson (2006b) and Godley and Lavoie (2007a) are grounded in the ‘endogenous money’ view of 
the economy, where banks’ credit creation is viewed as central and indispensible for transacting and 
thus for economic activity at large. Levels of wealth and debt are recognized to affect banks’, firms’ 
and  the  public’s  balance  sheets,  and  thus  economic  activity.  The  contrast  is  with  neoclassical 
economics on which equilibrium models are based, where wealth plays no (or only a small) role and 
money is incidental to the economic process, which is seen as driven by real-sector fundamentals. 
This  emphasis  on  financial  balance  sheets  and  the  monetary  nature  of  the  economy  is  what 
distinguishes accounting models also from input-output models, which describe flows of goods and 
services  perhaps  denominated  in  money  terms,  but  without  finance  and  the  flow  of  funds  it 
generates playing a role in the model dynamics. For instance, “[f]lows of interest are not often 
discussed in the literature, although a model of the whole system cannot be solved unless they are 
explicitly included” (Godley 1999:397). 
As to behavioural equations, equating of marginal cost and revenue would be inconsistent 
with the radical uncertainty theorized by Keynes. This implies that firms are in a state of uncertainty 
over future sales and revenues and do not even know their precise objective function, let alone have 
the computing power to continually solve it, as in neoclassical theory. Hence firms cannot respond 
to future prices while planning future production. Rather, firms may be assumed to respond to sold 
quantities, via changes in their inventories. 
The  introduction  of  uncertainty,  and  the  absence  of  maximizing  to  a  single  optimum, 
likewise  shapes  the  behavioural  assumptions  on  households  and  the  government.  For  instance, 
households are assumed to hold wealth in a number of assets, allocating over assets according to 
their expected returns. Consumption, in turn, depends on these wealth holding preferences as well 
as income. As expectations can be volatile, ‘when unexpected things happen, these assets move in 
correspondingly unexpected ways’ (Godley 1999: 397), and so does consumption, demand, and the 
wider economy. They depend, not on some equilibrium condition, but on how flows of funds and 
goods adjust to changes in stocks. Changes in this theoretical system therefore can be much more 
abrupt and economy-wide crisis resulting from perceptions and wealth changes is possible. 
As to underlying model philosophy, “a model, of necessity, is an abstraction from the full 
detail of the real world”, as Greenspan (2008) reminded his readers and himself after the crash. 
Accounting models differ from equilibrium models in what they abstract from. Equilibrium models 
abstract from the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt, and the systemic risks implied in 
them; they focus on the optimization problems facing individuals. It is assumes that any impact of 
the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt are fully reflected in returns and risks at the 
individual level, so that this is what analysis needs to be about. Accounting models abstract from   25 
optimization  problems  and  focus  on  the  flow  of  funds  and  the  stocks  of  credit  and  debt.  The 
assumption is that individual decisions will always be reflected in the aggregate flow of funds and 
the stocks of credit and debt, and that this is where an economy’s rate of return and systemic risks 
are formed; and so that this is what a model needs to chart. 
But when Greenspan (2008) wrote that “we will never have a perfect model of risk”, he 
meant individual-level, not systemic risk. His (and the mainstream) view is that systemic analysis is 
not valid scientifically  without an individual-level underpinning (“micro fundamentals”), and is 
redundant  with  it.  ”He  espoused  the  idea  that  mathematical  econometric  models  of  individual 
behaviour are the only tools we will ever have” (Shiller 2008:42). This contrasts to the analyses 
discussed in section 3 which are all on the level of the economic system, not the individual. 
Relatedly, an important difference between accounting and equilibrium models is that the 
identity equations in an accounting model aim to reflect the flow of funds in the economy in a 
complete (though obviously stylised) manner. It is specified where each flow of funds comes from 
and where it goes. Each transaction is by some sector with some other sector (both well specified) 
and leads to two equal changes in balance sheets. In contrast, equilibrium models do not aim at such 
completeness. For instance, an increase in the money supply in an accounting model is reflected in 
changes in the accounts of banks and lenders, whereas an increase in the money supply in the 
typical macrocoenomic model (see Figure 4, top left) simply is an increase in the value of the 
money stock (M2 or M3) ex nihilo; the actual money creation process, and the accompanying flow 
of funds (principal and interest payments) is not specified. 
Accordingly, in equilibrium models, solving the optimization problems is what determines 
the model outcome. In accounting models, its completeness drives the outcome, as the ‘watertight 
accounting of the model implies that there will always be one equation which is logically implied 
by  the  others’  (Godley  1999:395)  –  with  important  practical  implications.  For  instance,  in 
accounting models including a private sector (firms and households), a government sector and a 
foreign sector, sectoral balances must sum to zero. Specifically, Godley and Lavoie (2007b:xxxvi) 
note the ‘strategic importance’ of the ‘accounting identity which says that, measured in current 
prices, the government’s budget deficit less the current account deficit is equal, by definition, to 
private saving minus investment’. This identity allowed Godley and Wray (2000) to conclude that 
‘Goldilocks was doomed’: with a government surplus and current account deficit, economic growth 
had to be predicated on private debt growth – an inference impossible to make from an equilibrium 
model. Accounting models can identify a growth path as unsustainable given the existing bedrock 
accounting  relations  in  our  economic  system,  leading  to  a  sure  prediction  of  its  reversal  (even 
though  the  triggering  event,  and  its  timing,  will  be  less  clear).  No  such  certainty  is  built  into   26 
equilibrium models, where financial market failure is doubly impossible – first, because the system 
alwyus  return  to  an  equilibrium  and  market  failure  per  se  is  impossible;  and  second,  because 
financial  markets  quite  simply  do  not  exist in  the  model.  But,  as  McSweeney  (2009:2)  writes, 
“[c]ontrary  to  these  denials  of  the  possibility  of  the  failure  of  contemporary  financial  markets, 
financial markets have failed. 
 
 
7.  Accountants and Economists: Theoretical Pedigree of Macroeconomic Models 
 
In the preceding sections, accounting (or flow-of-funds) and equilibrium models were identified and 
discussed with regard to their structure, institutionalization and underlying assumptions. Finally, it 
is illuminating to reflect on an important difference also in theoretical pedigree – a difference which 
goes back to the very beginnings of modern economics. Macro-economic equilibrium models are 
ultimately  grounded in the model of a national  economy pioneered by the French 18
th century 
economist Francois Quesnay, who drew up the Tableau Economique, and whose followers were the 
first to be called ‘economists’. The Tableau described the circular flow of goods (but not of funds) 
through the various sectors of the economy. Accounting models, on the other hand, are circular-
flow models like Quesnay’s Tableau, but the emphasis on the importance of the circulation of funds 
(not only goods) distinguishes it from Quesnay and from modern equilibrium theory. This view of 
the  economic  system  is  summarized  in  the  much-misunderstood  ‘Say’s  Law’  that  ‘production 
creates its own demand’, named after the French 18
th century thinker Jean Baptiste Say. 
The  principal  difference  between  the  two  views  is  that  Quesnay  and  the  économistes 
neglected the positive roles of trade, entrepreneurship, capital ownership, and money, and attributed 
all productive value ultimately to agriculture (which gave the school its name of Physiocrats). Say, 
in contrast, recognised what would now be called the demand side of the economy: the importance 
of  the  purchasing  power  embodied  in  money  to  keep  the  circular  flow  moving,  and  of  the 
intermediaries of traders and bankers to make this happen. Demand must balance supply, and assets 
liabilities.  The  circulation  of  goods  in  the  real  economy  is  mirrored  by  the  origination  and 
movement of debt claims in the financial system, and the development of the complete economic 
system  can only  be understood taking both circuits into account.  In  contrast, money  and other 
financial flows were absent from Quesnay’s Tableau. While it is true that “[b]oth Say’s Law and 
the theory of equilibrium income – its intellectual complement and historical rival – can be traced 
back to a common origin in the Physiocrats”, as Sowell (1972:219) wrote, this does little to help   27 
understand  the  important  differences  between  the  two  approaches.  Indeed,  Say  has  often  been 
misconstrued (Baumol, 1977). 
If  the  Physiocrats  were  économistes,  then  Say’s  was  an  accountant’s  approach  to  the 
national economy. The point he made in the law that bears his name (‘production creates its own 
demand’)  was  not  about  a  tendency  to  equilibrium.  Say’s  Law  was  not  that  in  a  free  market, 
demand  and  supply  will  automatically  equilibriate  though  the  price  mechanism  leading  to  full 
employment – an interpretation of it that Keynes attacked during the Great Depression. Say’s Law 
is  an  accountant’s  logical  equality:  all  sold  output  will  be  bought
9.  "Inherent  in  supply  is  the 
wherewithal  for  its  own  consumption",  is  the  literal  translation  from  the  French,  where  ‘the 
wherewithal’ is perhaps best understood as ‘the funds’. The purchasing power embodied in the 
funds acquired by producers to produce goods, passes via wages and profit to become the funds that 
embody the demand for those goods. Though this is an axiom, it is not therefore a tautology without 
analytical use. As demonstrated above, it is the very logical completeness of accounting models that 
allows for their distinctive analytical and forecasting ability, e.g. on how sustainable debt-driven 
growth is. For instance, it implies that if the funds acquired by producers to produce goods are 
drained to the FIRE sector in debt servicing, this will interrupt the productive flow of fund and so 
disrupt economic growth
10. 
Say’s ‘accountant’s view’ of the economic system was the main cause of his dispute with 
the Physiocrats. Tellingly, the arch father of the Physiocrats, Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, 
wrote to Say begging him to ‘leave the counting house’ and not to ‘imprison himself in the ideas 
and language of the British, a sordid people who value a man only by the money he spends…” 
(Whatmore 2001: 38). Discounting the Gallic chauvinism, Dupont had still keenly perceived the 
essence  of  Say’s  view  on  the  importance  of  purchasing  power  to  set  in  motion  the  ‘wheel  of 
commerce’, in the words of Adam Smith (whom Say venerated). It was this reality of the monetary 
side  of  the  circular  flow  that  is  the  economy,  which  Say  attempted  to  capture  –  a  dimension 
conveniently abstracted from in the Physiocrats’ system, which represented only the real economy, 
with money as a mere unit of account and a means of aggregation. 
Conversely, Say’s principal grudge against the Physiocrats (whom he ridiculed with zest) 
was  their  penchant  for  such  abstraction.  In  his  Treatise  on  Political  Economy  he  wrote  that 
“[i]nstead  of  first  observing  the  nature  of  things,  or  the  manner  in  which  they  take  place,  of 
classifying these observations, and deducing from them general propositions, they commenced by 
                                                 
9 As Sowell (1972) notes, Say’s Law in turn goes back on yet earlier observations, perhaps as early as Ecclesiastes 5:11 
(3
rd century BC): "As goods increase, so do those who consume them”. 
10 I thank Gunnar Tómasson for drawing my attention to the original interpretation of Say’s Law.   28 
laying down certain abstract general propositions, which they styled axioms, from supposing them 
to  contain  inherent  evidence  of  their  own  truth.  They  then  endeavoured  to  accommodate  the 
particular facts to them, and to infer from them their laws; thus involving themselves in the defence 
of  maxims  evidently  at  variance  with  common  sense  and  universal  experience…”  (Treatise  on 
Political Economy, Book I, paragraph 47). In terms of scientific method, there was a clash between 
the  Physiocrats’  deductivism  and  Say’s  inductivism.  This  is  mirrored  today  in  the  deductivist 
methodology of neoclassical economics (which starts with ’abstract general propositions’ such as 
individual  utility  maximization)  which  differs  from  those  heterodox  approaches  which  aim  to 
inductively ‘first observe the nature of things’ before moving to ‘general propositions’. Accounting 
models include the flow of funds in the ‘nature of things’ to be reflected in its general proposition 
(or models); equilibrium models abstract from the flow of funds and from accounting relations from 
the very first of its axioms. So although “[b]oth Say’s law and the theory of equilibrium income – 
its intellectual complement and historical rival – can be traced back to a common origin in the 
Physiocrats…“ (Sowell 1973:219), their analytical view differed widely already at the beginning. 
This intellectual duel between Say and the Physiocrats gave rise to two distinct schools. In 
the development of economics as a discipline, it is fair to say that the Physiocrat approach won this 
duel hands down. Say’s approach survived via the works of, among others, Mill (1848), Keynes 
(1930)  and  Schumpeter  (1954)  into  current  theorizing  by  the  ‘Post-Keynesian’  and  ‘circuitist’ 
schools of economics (e.g. Rochon 1999; Fontana 2000; Graziani 2003; Godley and Lavoie 2007b; 
Keen 2009). This emphasizes the circular flow of funds, accounting relations in the economy, and 
the monetary context of production and consumption. Academically, this approach is marginalized. 
It is not taught in academic (under)graduate courses on money and banking or on monetary policy, 
nor publicised in even the top 100 of economics journals (ranked, for instance, by impact rating). 
In contrast, the neglect of credit and debt remained central as 18
th and 19
th century political 
economy developed into the 20
th century academic discipline of economics. It was incorporated in 
(and  greatly  facilitated)  the  ‘Marginal  Revolution’  in  the  late  19
th  century,  which  installed 
individual  optimization firmly  as  the  central  organizing  principle  in  economic  models.  Its  core 
model of the economy became Leon Walras’ construction of a set of interconnected commodity 
markets which simultaneously clear through the interaction of commodity price signals. This laid 
the foundation for general equilibrium theory, with no role for money (let alone credit and debt). 
The Tableau Economique also underpinned the later invention of input-output models pioneered by 
Wasily Leontief, and operationalised into national accounting models from the 1930s to 1950s by 
Richard Stone in the UK, Ragnar Frisch in Norway, Jan Tinbergen in the Netherlands and Robert 
Solow in the US. In the construction of the national statistics, the Tableau culminated in the System   29 
of National Accounts, the authorative prescription for GDP calculations published jointly by the 
United Nations, the Commission of the European Communities, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank. In academic 
analysis, the Physiocrat spirit culminated in money-less Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models widely used today in policy analyses as diverse as fiscal reform, development planning, 
international trade and environmental regulation (e.g. Wing 2004:2). 
 
 
8.  Summary, Reflections and Conclusions 
 
This paper made the fundamental point that recognizing the accounting forms in which economic 
relations of necessity exist, is indispensible for understanding the economic and financial system’s 
sustainability. Those forms are perhaps best analyzed in flow-of-funds or ‘accounting’ models of 
the  macro  economy.  The  argument  was  developed  with  reference  to  the  discrepancy  between 
professional assessment and reality before and during the 2007-8 credit crisis and ensuing recession. 
This study documented the sense of surprise at the credit crisis among academics and policymakers, 
giving  rise  to  the  view  that  ‘no  one  saw  this  coming’.  Contradicting  this  common  opinion,  it 
critically  reviewed  the  analyses  by  those  professional  and  academic  analysts  who  did  ‘see  it 
coming’, and who issued public predictions of financial instability induced by falling real estate 
prices and leading to recession. The common elements in their analyses were identified, implying 
an  ‘accounting’  view  of  the  economy.  The  structure  of  accounting  (or  flow-of-funds)  models 
underlying these predictions was explored, as were the structure and crisis prediction performance 
of ‘equilibrium’ models used to form official forecasts in central banks, by governments and by 
international bodies. The key differences between the two types of models were brought out in a 
systematic comparison of their underlying assumptions and their theoretical pedigrees. It was also 
suggested  that  the  institutionalization  of  official  models,  and  their  reflection  of  mainstream 
economic theories, may so far have precluded the adoption of accounting models. In conclusion of 
this paper, two reflections seem apt. 
  The upshot of this paper is not to advocate a wholesale replacement of equilibrium models. 
In introducing accounting concepts into conventional models (as the OECD is doing), the challenge 
may well be to explore how far model synergies and incompatibilities reach, and what type of 
model is best fit for which purpose. In the context of break points in economic development such as 
the credit crisis, it is “better to be roughly right than precisely wrong’, as Keynes famously wrote. In 
situations where the FIRE sector plays  a crucial role, equilibrium models such as the WUMM   30 
provide detailed forecasts on e.g. labour force participation, unit costs, hourly compensation and 
civilian employment, but fail to anticipate momentous change due to debt growth. Conversely, the 
accounting models reviewed here include less detail on the real sector but are better at identifying 
finance-driven turning points. 
Exploration of the synergies and proper domains of accounting and equilibrium models, 
however, would require an open-minded consideration of the merits of accounting models of the 
economy. This still appears to sit uneasily with the continued dominance in policy making and 
academia (including the field of accounting) of neoclassical economics. Hopwood (2009) perceives 
economics as “a subject … that invest quite heavily in the policing of its intellectual boundaries” 
and  where  “much  of  the  diversity  [of  debates]  has  been  banished”.  The  current  crisis  may  be 
changing this attitude.  One indication is  a recent paper by Federal Reserve  researcher Michael 
Palumbo, who with Jonathan Parker of Northwestern University wondered in the title of their paper 
if “the integrated financial and real System of National Accounts (SNA) for the United States would 
have presaged the financial crisis”? They note that the advantage of the SNA is that it ‘integrates 
financial and real information’ and conclude (p 2) from a study of the financial and capital accounts 
of the SNA that it did ‘signal an increased exposure of consumer demand to decreases in asset 
values. But we do not observe the extent to which a subset of highly-leveraged homes/mortgages 
moved  housing  risk  from  the  homeowner  to  the  lender….  [It]  did  not  convey  the  substantial 
vulnerabilities that accumulated in the financial system during the 2000’s and that turned a housing 
correction into a financial crisis and deep recession.” As the sources of those vulnerabilities they 
identify risk, leverage, maturity mismatch, and balance sheet complexity. In consequence, Palumbo 
and Parker (2009:9-12) recommend that the SNA show more detailed, disaggregated asset classes 
(exposing the riskier ones) and disaggregated institutions (exposing the more leveraged ones, and 
those with larger maturity mismatches and balance sheet complexity), to ‘presage’ the possibility of 
crisis. 
Whilst these are surely helpful recommendations - including financial and capital variables 
in official macroeconomic assessment would be a major step forward -,  the authors seem oblivious 
of the fact that this presaging is precisely what the Godley model employed at the Levy Institute 
had been doing from before 2000, actually using the disaggregation of assets and institutions they 
recommend. What is also missing is any discussion of the size of the US debt and its systemic 
implications as a constraint on further US growth, which is central in the flow-of-fund models 
discussed in the present paper, and which underpinned Godley and Wray’s (2000) prediction that 
‘Goldilocks is doomed’. From the latter perspective, analysing the flow of funds for crisis potential 
without reviewing debt build-up as in Palumbo and Parker (2009), is akin to avoiding a discussion   31 
of the elephant in the room. The Palumbo and Parker (2009) paper so illustrates that there may be a 
new  openness  to  mutual  learning  between  ‘equilibrium’  and  ‘accounting’  prisms  of  financial 
stability, but also continued (mutual?) ignorance of each others’ work, and continuing fundamental 
differences in assessment.  
To  be  fair,  those  barriers  are  not  only  in  the  field  of  economics.    Arnold  (2009)  self-
criticizes the accounting field by  asserting that  “our dominant theories  provided an insufficient 
bases  for  understanding  the  transformations  that  were  occurring  in  the  international  political 
economy  over  the  past  quarter  century,  or  for  analyzing  the  relationship  between  macro  level 
changes, such as the rise to power of the financial sector, and the micro level field of financial 
accounting practice.” Hopwood (2007: 1370,1372) notes that ‘accounting scholars seem to relate 
primarily to themselves’ and sees the research community as ‘too conservative, too intellectually 
constrained,  too  conformist’.  And  yet  there  is  real  scope,  and  real  need,  for  an  ‘accounting  of 
economics’ in the field of macroeconomic and macrofinancial stability assessment and forecasting, 
in parallel to the promotion by some of an ‘economics of accounting’ to improve analysis in the 
field of management accounting (Christensen and Feltham 2007; Jordan 1989), there appears to be 
scope for. For economists are often ignorant about accounting; and those who are not, are seldom 
orthodox  neoclassical  analysts.  Kenneth  Boulding  (1910-1993)  reflecting  on  his  life  in  From 
Chemistry to Economics and Beyond recounts how in 1934 he was given a book on accounting by 
William Baxter (later professor of accounting at the London School of Economics) which, he writes 
“had great impact on my economic thought. For the first time in my life I began to understand what 
a balance sheet was, which nobody had ever told me at Oxford or even at Chicago (Boulding, 
1992:72).” What is more, Boulding realized there is an ‘accounting of economics’: he went on to 
write  his  1950  book  ‘A  Reconstruction  of  Economics’  which  is  a  balance-sheet  approach  to 
economics and a precursor to the fully fledged Post-Keynesian models by Graziani, Rochon, Keen, 
and  Godley  discussed  in  this  paper.  But  seventy-five  years  on,  the  accounting  dimension  of 
‘economics’  is  still  vastly  underappreciated;  the  subject  of  accounting  itself  is  absent  from  the 
curriculum  in  many  economics  degree  programmes.  Boulding’s  formative  experience  is  still 
withheld from so many would-be economic researchers and policy makers. 
So what would an ‘accounting of economics’ research and teaching programme look like? It 
would have as its central tenet that we need to understand how dynamics in accounting relations 
underpin  and  shape  our  economies.  The  underlying  reason  is  that  economic  relations  and 
transactions  in  modern  economies  are  embedded  in  the  double-entry  accounting  framework, 
because they occur in a monetized, capitalist economy. All transacting is predicated on economic 
agents  extending  credit  to  each  other,  including  trade  credit  and  bank  credit,  which  is  money.    32 
Therefore economic relations entail debtor/creditor relations. Money is not just a unit of account; it 
is the reflection of relations of debit and credit, and thus money itself is an accounting concept 
(Wray 1998, 2004). Having a monetary economic system is predicated on accounting relations and 
the regulations that shape them. The implication is that an accounting lens is indispensable in the 
analysis of financial stability. This is the accounting dimension of the ‘significance of the monetary 
context of economic behavior’ also researched in heterodox economics (Fontana and Gerard 2002; 
Godley and Lavoie 2007b). 
More  specifically,  the  balance  sheets  of  firms,  households  and  governments,  and  the 
regulations in the economic system on what sorts of balance sheets are allowed, and the cost/benefit 
consequences of different balance sheets compositions via e.g. tax legislation, all co-determine what 
forms new credit flows can take, how much there can be of it to different sectors (e.g. to the FIRE 
sector versus the real economy), and consequently how the economy will evolve. These will not be 
the only factors shaping the economy, but neither can they be fully abstracted from, as is current 
practice in much of economic research, and indeed among accounting researchers. For instance, 
Arnold (2009) urges that accounting researchers need to be asking questions such as “why did 
standard  setters  adopt  fair  value  accounting  for  financial  instruments  without  regard  for  the 
macroeconomic  consequences  of  sanctioning  the  proliferation  of  complex,  unregulated  and 
systematically  dangerous  financial  products?”.  There  seem  to  be  important  contributions  that 
accounting  researchers  can  make  to  economics  -  rather  than  just  the  other  way  round,  as  is 
sometimes suggested. They  should be bolder in pointing out and analyzing the implications of 
specific accounting rules and practices for macroeconomic development, and probing the political 
economy reasons for their introduction. This study has sought to provide a context for such research 
to be undertaken.   33 
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Appendix: They Saw It Coming 
 
 
In collecting the data presented in this Appendix in an extensive search of the relevant literature, 
four selection criteria were applied. Only analysts were included who provide some account on how 
they arrived at heir conclusions. Another criterion was that analysts went beyond predicting a real 
estate crisis, also making the link to real-sector recessionary implications, including an analytical 
account of those links
11. Third, the actual prediction must be made by the analyst and available in 
the public domain, rather than being asserted by others. Finally, the prediction had to have some 
timing attached to it
12.  
The twelve analysts described here – the number is entirely an outcome of the selection 
criteria – commented on the US, UK, Australian and Danish situations. All are (or were) analysts or 
commentators of global fame. They are presented in alphabetical order. 
 
Dean Baker is co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington
13. Baker 
discussed the consequences of the bubble in the US housing market in 2002, when he wrote that 
“[w]hile the short-term effects of a housing bubble appear very beneficial—just as was the case 
with the stock bubble and the dollar bubble—the long-term effects from its eventual deflation can 
be extremely harmful, both to the economy as a whole, and to tens of millions of families that will 
see much of their equity disappear unexpectedly. The economy will lose an important source of 
demand as housing construction plummets and the wealth effect goes into reverse. This will slow an 
economy  already  reeling  from  the  effects  of  the  collapse  of  the  stock  bubble  [of  1999, 
DJB]…Unfortunately, most of the nation’s political and economic leadership remained oblivious to 
the dangers of the stock market and dollar bubbles until they began to deflate. This failure created 
the basis for the economic uncertainty the country currently faces … [which] will be aggravated 
further by the deflation of the housing bubble. This process will prove even more painful if the 
housing bubble is allowed to expand still further before collapsing” (Baker 2002). Further expand it 
                                                 
11 This criterion excludes, for instance, John Talbott, a former investment banker for Goldman Sachs and a visiting 
scholar at UCLA’s management school. He wrote The Coming Crash of the Housing Market” and Sell Now! The End of 
the Housing Bubble (January 2006), both of which accurately described overlending practices and the housing bubble. 
Talbott hints at the wider implications but does not analyse them. 
12 This last criterion excludes economist Raghuram Rajan of the University of Chicago who in a 2005 paper discussed 
how perverse incentives in deregulated financial markets posed a risk to the economy, but without any indication of 
when  trouble might break. The paper was presented at a Kansas City Federal Reserve Symposium under the theme of  
“The Greenspan era: Lessons for the Future”. It also excludes Claudio Borio, an economist with the Bank for 
International Settlements, who in a 2004 paper titled “ Market Distress And Vanishing Liquidity: Anatomy And Policy 
Options” wrote that “contrary to conventional wisdom, the growth of markets for tradable instruments, and hence the 
greater scope to sell assets and raise cash, need not actually reduce the likelihood of traditional funding liquidity crises. 
Conceivably, in fact, it could even raise that likelihood,…” 
13 Not to be confused with the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research, which never predicted a crisis.   35 
did,  and  in  early  2004  Baker  sponsored  a  $1,000  essay  contest  to  solicit  the  most-convincing 
argument that the housing market was not in a bubble
14 (Lewis, 2004). In May 2004, Baker sold his 
apartment in the Washington Adams Morgan. He was quoted as saying “I felt like a fool holding 
onto it I’m pretty sure that prices around here will plummet”
15. 
In 2005 Baker predicted in a scholarly paper that asset prices in the US were bound to fall in 
the medium term (Baker et al 2005). In November 2006, he published the more urgent Recession 
Looms for the U.S. Economy in 2007 in which he forecasts that weakness in the housing market was 
likely to push the economy into a recession in 2007, predicting -0.7 % GDP growth over 2007. 
Baker wrote that “[t]he wealth effect created by the housing bubble fuelled an extraordinary surge 
in consumption over the last five years, as savings actually turned negative. …This home equity-
fuelled consumption will be sharply curtailed in the near future…. The result will be a downturn in 
consumption  spending,  which  together  with  plunging  housing  investment,  will  likely  push  the 
economy into recession….Over the course of the year, the economy will shed 1.2 million jobs.” 
Baker’s prediction was only slightly premature as official US GDP growth remained a positive 2 % 
in 2007 on average, though falling towards the end of the year. The US recession officially started 
in December 2007, costing 1.6 jobs till December 2008 (BEA figures).  
 
Wynne Godley is a Distinguished Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New 
York and a Visiting Research Associate with the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance 
(2002-2005).  From  2000  he  has  consistently  argued  that  a  US  housing  market  slowdown  was 
unavoidable in the medium term, and that its implication would be recession in the US. Godley 
warned that ‘Goldilocks is doomed’, as he put it in a 2000 article with Wray. ‘Goldilocks’ was the 
simile after the children’s tale, employed in the years after the dotcom crash for the US economy, 
which was said to be neither too ‘cold’ (low unemployment) nor too ‘hot’ (low inflation). Godley 
and Wray (2000) argued that this stability was unsustainable, as it was driven by households’ debt 
growth, in turn fuelled by capital gains in the real estate sector. Based on an accounting framework 
of the US economy developed by Godley (on which more below), they predicted that that as soon as 
debt growth slowed down – as it inevitably would within years -, growth would falter. When house 
prices had started to fall, Godley and Zezza (2006) published Debt and Lending: A Cri de Coeur. 
They demonstrated again the US economy’s dependence on debt growth and argued that only the 
small slowdown in the rate at which US household debt levels were rising, resulting form the house 
                                                 
14 The winning essayist, Hilary Croke, was a researcher for the Federal Reserve. 
15 The average price of Adams Morgan neighbourhood started dropping from their November 2005 peak of US$ 
551,000 to a low of US$ 480,000 in January 2007. It was at the same level in February 2009 (data from zillow.com).   36 
price decline, would immediately lead to a “sustained growth recession … somewhere before 2010” 
(Godley  and  Zezza,  2006:3).  In  January  2007,  the  US  Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO) 
produced  its  annual  report,  which,  as  Godley  and  others  noted  in  an  April  2007  analysis,  had 
predictions on GDP and inflation “indicating a Goldilocks world in the medium term” which they 
deemed ”wildly implausible” (p.1) as it required continued growth in household indebtedness while 
real estate collateral values were I na steep and continued fall. In contrast to CBO projections of 
GDP growth averaging 2.85 percent between 2007 and 2010, Godley in April 2007 predicted output 
growth “slowing down almost to zero sometime between now and 2008 and then recovering toward 
3  percent  or  thereabouts  in  2009–10”;  but  warned  that  “unemployment  [will]  start  to  rise 
significantly and does not come down again.” (Godley et al 2007: 3). Again, in November 2007 
Godley and others forecast “a significant drop in borrowing and private expenditure in the coming 
quarters, with severe consequences for growth and unemployment”. These forecasts describe the 
actual developments from spring 2007 until the time of this writing in spring 2009. If anything, they 
were sanguine: US growth not only ‘slowed to zero’ but actually turned negative in 2008, and the 
recovery ‘toward 3 percent or thereabouts in 2009–10’ is now widely forecast, but yet to start. 
 
The British Fred Harrison in his first book, “The Power in the Land” (1983), forecast the recessions 
in the leading industrial economies in 1992. In 2005 he published Boom Bust, warning that the 
property market is subject to a sharp downturn at the end of a regular 18-year cycle, based on 
Harrison’s study of UK property markets over the last 200 years. At a time when the consensus 
among forecasters was that the boom in house prices would cool to an annual 2 or 3% rise over the 
following years, Harrison analysed that a ‘winner’s curse’ phase of the cycle would see UK home 
prices rise by more than 10% per annum – which they did over 2006 and 2007. An updated second 
edition of Boom Bust predicted that the next property market tipping point was due at end of 2007 
or early 2008. The reason for the instability, Harrison explained, is not the housing market itself but 
the land market. Economic expansion encourages speculation, with banks lending more against 
escalating asset values and reinforcing the upward spiral. The only way land prices can be brought 
back to affordable levels is a slump or recession, undermining the banking system and causing 
widespread  unemployment  and  repossessions.  The  UK  housing  market  started  collapsing  in 
November 2007, followed by the recession Harrison had forecast. 
 
Michael Hudson is a Distinguished Research Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri 
(Kansas City), president of the Institute for the Study of Long-term Economic Trends and a Wall 
Street financial analyst. Hudson has criticized economic growth based on asset price inflation as   37 
unsustainable and polarizing. Based on his monitoring of the US National Product and Income 
Accounts, he wrote Saving, Asset-Price Inflation, and Debt-Induced Deflation, a paper presented at 
a 2004 academic conference and subsequently published as Hudson (2006a). In it, he noted the 
‘large debt overhead – and the savings that form the balance-sheet counterpart to it’ as the ‘anomaly 
of  today’s  [US]  economy’.  He  warned  against  the  ‘self  expanding  growth  of  savings’  and  the 
unsustainable ‘growth of net worth through capital gains’, fuelled by US monetary policies (of 
generous credit flows and decreasing interest rates) and tax policies (of un-taxing real estate gains 
in their treatment of  depreciation and interest payments). In his analysis, the “natural limit to the 
process was reached in 2004 when the Federal Reserve reduced its discount rate to 1 percent. Once 
rates hit this nadir, further growth in debt threatens to be reflected in draining and amortization 
payments away from spending on goods and services, slowing the economy accordingly.” 
In 2005 Hudson wrote ‘The Road to Serfdom: An Illustrated Guide to the Coming Real 
Estate  Collapse’,  which  was  published  in  April  2006  in  Harper’s  Magazine.  In  it  he  wrote 
that ”almost everyone involved in the real estate bubble thus far has made at least a few dollars. But 
that is about to change. The bubble will burst… America holds record mortgage debt in a declining 
housing market… For those who bought at the top and who now face decades of payments on 
houses that soon will be worth less than they paid for them, serious trouble is brewing. …. Rising 
debt-service payments will further divert income from new consumer spending. Taken together, 
these factors will further shrink the “real” economy, drive down those already declining real wages, 
and push our debt-ridden economy into Japan-style stagnation or worse.” (Hudson 2006b). That 
summer the housing market turned, leading to the credit crisis and recession a year later. 
 
Eric Janszen is an investor and commentator. He established the iTulip website in November 1998 
to  parody  the  then  rampant  ‘Internet  Bubble’  as  a  speculative  mania.  He  called  the  top  of  the 
dotcom bubble in March 2000 and shut the site down after the dotcom crash of that year; but started 
it again as the housing market developed into what he believed to be a bubble. In August 2001 
Janszen  (2001)  “expected  that  after  the  technology  bubble  crash  the  Federal  Reserve  and 
government was certain via tax cuts, rate cuts, and stealth dollar devaluation to induce a reflation 
boom like the 1934 – 1937 reflation created after the 1929 stock market bubble bust. Like that 
reflation,  the  stock  market  after  2001  was  unlikely  to  produce  meaningful  inflation-adjusted 
results.” 
In 2006 he wrote in America’s Bubble Economy: Profit When It Pops that the US would 
enter a recession within years. In December 2007 he warned subscribers to his investment advice 
that US stock markets were likely to begin in 2008 to experience a “Debt Deflation Bear Market”   38 
market that would more or less track the Nikkei during the first year of the Japanese debt deflation, 
when it lost 40 % from December 1989 to December 1990. The Dow Jones then declined from 
13,365 points in December 2007 to 7,880 points in December 2008, losing 42 % of its value. 
Janszen  (2009)  writes  that  “this  forecast  was  uncomplicated  if  you  understood  the  simple 
underlying dynamic: US households and businesses, and the government itself, had since 1980 built 
up too much debt. The rate of increase in debt was unsustainable… Huge imbalances in the US and 
global economy developed for over 30 years. Now they are rebalancing, as many non-mainstream 
economists have warned was certain to happen sooner or later, warnings which were argued as 
alarmist by mainstream economists. The global monetary system … started to come apart in 2007 
following the crash of the securitized debt market, that followed the collapse of the housing bubble. 
It had to come apart anyway; the securitized bond market happened to be the proximate cause.” 
 
Stephen Keen is Associate Professor of Economics & Finance at the University of Western Sydney 
and  a  fellow  of  the  Centre  for  Policy  Development.  A  specialist  in  financial  instability,  –  he 
published an academic paper in 1995 titled Finance and Economic Breakdown – Keen (2008) wrote 
that “[i]n December 2005, almost two years before the crisis hit, I realized that a serious financial 
crisis was approaching. I was so worried about its probable severity–and the lack of awareness 
about it amongst policy makers–that I took the risk (for an academic) of going very public about my 
views.  I  began  commenting  on  economic  policy  in  the  media,  started  the  DebtWatch  Report, 
registered a webpage with the apt name of www.debtdeflation.com, and established the blog Steve 
Keen’s Oz Debtwatch.” 
He first publicly predicted Australia’s financial troubles in December 2005 in an interview 
on Perth radio and ABC Radio. In December 2006, Keen (2006) wrote that the debt-to-GDP ratio in 
Australia (then 147 per cent) “will exceed 160 per cent of GDP by the end of 2007. We simply can’t 
keep  borrowing  at  that  rate.  We  have  to  not  merely  stop  the  rise  in  debt,  but  reverse  it. 
Unfortunately, long before we manage to do so, the economy will be in a recession. The reasons are 
simple:  paying  down  excessive  debt  causes  borrowers  to  stop  spending…  So  when  will  this 
recession begin? On current data, the domestic economy may already be in one – though the China 
boom  has  more  than  compensated  for  the  domestic  downturn.  What  can  be  done  to  avoid  it? 
Unfortunately,  almost  nothing.”  In  September  2007  he  published,  with  the  Centre  for  Policy 
Development, the report “Deeper in Debt”, writing that “our current problems [will] lead, I expect, 
to  severe  economic  dislocation”  (Keen  2007:  45).  In  January  2009  the  IMF  revised  its  1.8  % 
forecast  for  Australian  GDP  growth  in  2009  down  by  an  unprecedented  2  %,  to    –  0.2  %   39 
(Stutchbury 2009). The Reserve Bank of Australia in May 2009 revised its 2009 forecast from 0.5 
% to -1.0 % (Kwok 2009). 
 
Jakob Brøchner Madsen is a professor in economics at Monash University.  From 2003, while 
professor in economics at the University of Copenhagen, he has questioned the sustainability of 
Denmark’s growth. According to Madsen, Danes were living on borrowed time because of the 
mortgage debt which “had never been greater in our economic history”. The Danish business paper 
Børsen in its December 4, 2008 issue featured an overview of his forebodings (Agaard 2008). In 
2003 Madsen wrote “I am very pessimistic. We are heading into something in the world which is 
worse than what we experienced in 1982 [the last Danish recession, DJB]. It will be the worst 
recession since the Second World War”. In 2004: “There is something completely wrong. We are 
seeing large bubbles and if they bust, there is no backup. House prices and shares are completely 
out of proportion. And it will go wrong. … The outlook is very bad for families in Denmark.” In 
2005: “I feel lost. Money growth is increasing, oil and commodity prices have doubled in the last 10 
years. Therefore inflation and interest rates should increase, but nothing happens. All the models we 
use to predict inflation have broken down, it is chaos.” 
Under Madsen’s supervision, his student Jens Kjaer Sørensen wrote an MA thesis in 2005-
2006 on ’The Dynamics of House Prices – International Evidence’ going back to 1920s-1930s (to 
the 1840s for the Netherlands). In it, Sørensen demonstrated the existence of the first international 
synchronized housing boom in the UK, Norway, US and the Netherlands. He showed that credit 
growth  due  to  liberalization  was  the  prime  cause,  and  that  it  was  a  bubble,  i.e.  prices  would 
inevitably fall sharply to their long-run trends. The bursting of this bubble “will have a severe 
impact on the world economy and may even result in a recession” (Sørensen, 2006:97). 
Jacob  Brøchner  Madsen  moved  to  Monash  University  in  2006.  His  farewell  talk  at  the 
University of Copenhagen on July 1, 2006 was entitled “Anatomy of the Bubble-Bust Cycle in the 
Danish Housing Market” In 2007, Madsen observed that “houses are overvalued and it is only a 
matter of time before they will start falling”. He predicted a decrease by up to 40 %. According to 
StatBank Denmark data, the growth in family homes price in Denmark petered out in the third 
quarter of 2007, and prices declined from that  peak by 12  % until the end of 2008, the latest 
observation the time of this writing. Economic growth halved from 3.3 % in 2006 to 1.6 % in 2007 
and the economy contracted by 1.1 % over 2008 (source: StatBank Denmark)
 16.  
 
                                                 
16 I thank Jens Sørensen for providing details and help in data collection in the Danish case study.    40 
Kurt  Richebächer  (1918-2007)  wrote  one  of  the  longest-standing  investment  newsletters,  “The 
Richebächer  Letter,”  which  at  various  times  also  circulated  as  “Currencies  &  Credit  Markets.” 
Richebächer was chief economist for Dresdner Bank from 1964 and moved into private consultancy 
in 1977. He warned against the bubble in technology stocks in the late ’90s. After its collapse, he 
warned  against  the  bubble  in  housing,  writing  in  September  2001:  “the  new  housing  boom  is 
another rapidly inflating asset bubble financed by the same loose money practices that fuelled the 
stock market bubble.” He went on to predict “that the housing bubble – together with the bond and 
stock bubbles – will invariably implode in the foreseeable future, plunging the U.S. economy into a 
protracted, deep recession.” (Bonner 2007). 
Writing in 2006, Richebächer held that “the recovery of the U.S. economy since November 
2001  has  been  dominated  by  an  unprecedented  consumer  borrowing-and-spending–
binge. …”wealth creation” though soaring asset prices has been driven by ultra-cheap and loose 
money and credit, and not by saving and investment…” Richebächer (2006a:4). Just before the 
turning of the US housing market in summer 2006, Richebächer (2006a:4) in July 2006 commented 
that “[t]he one thing that still separates the U.S. economy from economic and financial disaster is 
rising house prices that apparently justify ever more credit and debt”… “Given this precarious 
income situation on the one hand and the debt explosion on the other, it will be clear that in the 
foreseeable future there will be heavy selling of houses, with prices crashing for lack of buyers” 
(Richebächer, 2006a:11). As this prospect began to materialize in the next month, Richebächer 
wrote in his August 2006 newsletter that “a recession and bear market in asset prices are inevitable 
for the U.S. economy. … This will not be a garden-variety recession, in which monetary easing 
unleashes pent-up demand, as it used to do in past business cycles”. He again emphasized its cause: 
“the great trouble for the future is that the credit bubble has its other side in exponential debt 
growth” … “The U.S. liquidity deluge of the last few years has had one single source: borrowing 
against rising assets backed by the Fed’s monetary looseness… all hinging on further rises in asset 
prices. But they are going to plunge” (Richebächer, 2006b:1,5,9,11-12). And in September 2006 he 
wrote hat “housing bubbles, when bursting, generally do considerable damage to the economy. 
Today, they are bound to do far more damage….” (Richebächer, 2006c:4). The question was not if, 
but “how fast the U.S. economy and its asset markets will turn down. … “There is no question that 
the U.S. housing bubble is finished. All remaining questions pertain solely to speed, depth and 
duration of the economy’s downturn” (Richebächer, 2006c:9). 
Paul  Volker,  former  Chairman  of  the  US  Federal  Reserve  and  a  long-time  friend  of 
Richebächer,  once  remarked  that  the  challenge  for  modern  central  bankers  “is  to  prove  Kurt 
Richebächer wrong.” Richebächer regarded the expansion of credit under Greenspan as laying the   41 
foundation of the worst post-World War II economic contraction. He died on August 24, 2007, two 
weeks after the events leading up to that contraction began (Bonner, 2007). 
 
Nouriel  Roubini  is  Professor  of  Economics  and  International  Business  at  the  Stern  School  of 
Business, New York University, Research Associate at the NBER and Research Fellow with the 
CEPR. He is a former advisor to the U.S. Treasury Department and former member White House 
Council  of  Economic  Advisers.  He  runs  the  Roubini  Global  Economics  Monitor  and  a  Global 
Economics Blog (http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini, from which all quotes below are taken). 
He predicted in summer 2005 that real home prices were likely to fall at least 30% over the next 3 
years, and published warnings about the recessionary implications from the very beginning of the 
house price decline. On August 23, 2006, he wrote that “[b]y itself this [house price] slump is 
enough to trigger a US recession”. On August 30, he wrote that “[t]he recent increased financial 
problems of … sub-prime lending institutions may thus be the proverbial canary in the mine – or tip 
of the iceberg – and signal the more severe financial distress that many housing lenders will face 
when the current housing slump turns into a broader and uglier housing bust that will be associated 
with a broader economic recession. You can then have millions of households with falling wealth, 
reduced  real  incomes  and  lost  jobs…”  In  a  Nov  17,  2006  blog  he  analysed  that  “the  housing 
recession is now becoming a construction recession; and the construction recession is now turning 
into a clear auto and manufacturing recession; and the manufacturing recession will soon turn into a 
retail recession as squeezed households – facing falling home prices and rising mortgage servicing 
costs – sharply contract their rate of consumption.”  He correctly predicted that quantitative easing 
by the Federal Reserve would lead to a short lived stock rally at the end of 2006, turning into a 
share price plunge once a coming recession was obvious towards mid 2007. Through 2006 and 
2007, Roubini continued warning of further house price falls (where others saw it bottoming out), 
and of its systemic implications leading to recession in 2007.  
 
Peter Schiff is a stock broker, investment adviser and commentator. He was an economic adviser for 
Ron Paul’s campaign in the 2008 Republican Party primaries.  On May 16, 2006 in debate on the 
television channel Fox News, Schiff forecast that the U.S. housing market was a bubble that would 
soon burst. In an August 2006 CBNC interview, Peter Schiff asserted that : “[t]he United States 
economy is like the Titanic ...I see a real financial crisis coming for the United States.” He rose to 
media prominence following the publication of his book early 2007 book Crash Proof: How to 
Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse. Written over the previous two years, Crash Proof   42 
predicted the popping of the US housing bubble and the consequent financial crisis, including the 
failure of mortgage banks Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the collapse of the US financial sector.  
 
Robert Shiller is a Yale economics professor who predicted both the dotcom and housing bubbles. 
Shiller has noted that too much potential wealth is still locked up in land and real estate. In order to 
trace that wealth he created, with Karl Case, the authorative Case-Shiller Index of US home-prices. 
In The New Financial Order (2003) Shiller warned that infatuation with the stock market was 
fuelling volatility and distracting us from more durable economic prospects of building up real 
assets (as opposed to financial assets), ‘’fundamental to our well-being but increasingly exposed to 
pervasive risks” (Karabell, 2009). 
He published a book, Irrational Exuberance, on a bursting stock-market bubble just as the 
burst arrived in March 2000, and another, The Subprime Solution on the subprime meltdown just as 
the  meltdown  went  global  in  summer  2008.  He  warned  that  home  prices  were  looking  “very 
anomalous” in the 2
nd edition of Irrational Exuberance in 2005, published one  year before the 
market turned. In the preface to that edition he wrote that “ further rises in the [stock and housing] 
markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines… A long-run consequence could 
be a decline in consumer and business confidence, and another, possibly worldwide, recession. This 
extreme  outcome  …  is  not  inevitable,  but  it  is  a  much  more  serious  risk  than  is  widely 
acknowledged.” Again, in August 2006 he wrote that “there is significant risk of a very bad period, 
with slow sales, slim commissions, falling prices, rising default and foreclosures, serious trouble in 
financial markets, and a possible recession sooner than most of us expected” (Case and Shiller, 
2006).   43 
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